Abstract
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act passed by
Congress in 2020 included significant aid to state education systems. These
included direct aid to K-12 districts and higher education institutions, and funds
to be used at the discretion of Governors through the Governor’s Emergency
Education Relief Fund (GEER). We examine the factors influencing where and
how GEER funding was distributed across state K-12 systems and what inequities
were introduced in its spending. Using a mixed methods analysis of state GEER
spending plans and district-level finance data, we focus specifically on how
distribution sought to target schools serving disadvantaged student groups.
We find that several state leaders decided to send their GEER funds to school
districts via funding formulas, and that some Governors made decisions to
direct their GEER funds towards certain student groups. State spending patterns
were not strongly related to governor political ideology or the states’ existing
funding formulas or inter-district resource allocation patterns. We discuss the
implications of this policy related to two state case examples, California and
New York, and provide insight for future education stimulus funding proposals.
Congress in 2020 included significant aid to state education systems. These
included direct aid to K-12 districts and higher education institutions, and funds
to be used at the discretion of Governors through the Governor’s Emergency
Education Relief Fund (GEER). We examine the factors influencing where and
how GEER funding was distributed across state K-12 systems and what inequities
were introduced in its spending. Using a mixed methods analysis of state GEER
spending plans and district-level finance data, we focus specifically on how
distribution sought to target schools serving disadvantaged student groups.
We find that several state leaders decided to send their GEER funds to school
districts via funding formulas, and that some Governors made decisions to
direct their GEER funds towards certain student groups. State spending patterns
were not strongly related to governor political ideology or the states’ existing
funding formulas or inter-district resource allocation patterns. We discuss the
implications of this policy related to two state case examples, California and
New York, and provide insight for future education stimulus funding proposals.